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In the Supreme Court of the
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THOMAS F. KIRKHAM, Administrator of the
Estate of William Kirkham, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
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Defendants and Appellants.
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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
FACTS
In respect to the facts there are a number of mis-statements in the respondent's brief which the appellants feel
it necessary to correct.
First (P. 7 of respondent's brief) the trial court merely allowed Mr. Hinton to testify that he wrote a letter to
the defendants; its contents and purpose were not admitted.
Secondly, respondent implies ·by the second paragraph
on P. 8 of his brief that it was the appellants' desire to allow
the respondents to take further testimony, and that sub-
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sequently counsel ~or appellants changed his mind and objected. The actual fact is that counsel for appellant was
unable to notify his client, because of his client's absence
from his horne, that the court had re-opened the case and
had set the time for hearing on the date indicated. Rather
than inconvenience the court and respondent's counsel, suggested that they proceed but had no intention of waiving
formal objection. Objection was made properly and timely.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE (Respondent's Brief)
The respondent suggests on P. 13 of his argument that
he complied with the order of the court and made a thorough and complete search of the premises, and yet the
court said in its order: "and a more detailed search of the
premises wherein deceased lived after August 21, 1953, and
any other locations known to the heirs and representatives
of the decedent wherein the said decedent might have made
temporary disposition of $4800.00 paid to him prior to plaintiff's return frof vacation on August 22, 1953." Yet Mr.
Hinton testified that no such search was made because he
didn't think it was necessary, and in fact all that was offered was a more detailed and better fabricated re-telling
of the former search. In other words, the testimony offered by the plaintiff was of the same search previously
testified to; however, the re-telling was tailored to meet
the e~pressed requirements of the court.
POINT TWO (Respondent's Brief)
The respondent continues to argue "Facts" that were
never admitted as part of his case. For example, on P. 18
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of his brief, there was no evidence that demand was ever
made for payment by the plaintiff, and yet the respondent
desires that the Court come to a conclusion that the appellants' failure to reply to this fictional or hypothetical demand is evidence of the indebtedness. That unknown evidence not being before the Court it is clear that there is
no evidence to refute or contradict the receipt.
As a matter of fact, the respondent finds himself on
both sides of his own argument. He cites cases to show
that the trial court's e~ressed conclusions are not evidence,
and yet he cites them on P. 19 as such. There is no evidence whatsoever that the receipt was written by different
pencils, but I would say that if it were that would even more
so prove its authenticity.
POINT THREE (Respondent's Brief)
The respondent cites the case of Holm vs. Pauly, 106
P. 266, as authority for the proposition that the court on
its own motion can re-open. The case is hardly in point,
for it states none of the facts surrounding this issue, but
merely states that the court "suggested the re-opening of
the case" which is a great deal different than re-opening
it on its own motion. The probable reason for such
action is that one of the parties moved the court to re-open
this case. Another distinguishing feature about this case
is that it was commenced in 1902, partly tried on the 6th
day of December, 1905, and completed on the 16th day of
December, 1906, and the evidence introduced was not of a
prejudicial nature, in fact, was irrelevant and immaterial.
On Page 22 the respondent cites 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 222; however, he has failed to recite the first portion of the said citation, which clearly shows that this ci-
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tation is not authority for the court on its own motion to
re-open a case, and which also shows the reason for allowing such re-opening.
"Although it has been held that when parties have
afforded an adequate oppo.rtunity to present their res~
tive sides of t:..e case, ordinarily they will be compelled to
abide by the determination to rest, whether or not a case
shall be reopened for the introduction of evidence after both
parties have rested their cases in chief, or after the close
of the evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.
The discretion however should be reasonably exerc~ so
as not to prejudice the rights of the parties. The court
may permit the case to be re-opened to admit evidence
which, through inadvertence or mistake, was not introduced
at the proper time, and ordinarily it should do so, but it is
generally wholly within the discretion of the court whether
it will do so."
There was not one scintilla of evidence introduced by
the respondent upon re-opening that could not have been
introduced at time of trial, and there was absolutely no
showing or even a contention raised by the respondent of
inadvertence or mistake. If the court can re-open as it did
in rthis case, then the appellants cannot imagine a situa_tion where a re-opening would even be an abuse of discretion.
Respondent's other citations in support of his argument are merely footnotes in Corpus Juris Secundum which
do not even carry an editor's note. Because they are to
foreign reports the appellants do not have the opportunity
to refute them; however, they can hardly be taken as authority.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court
shotUd be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

JACKSON B. HOWARD
SANDGREN, HOWARD & FRAZIER
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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